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  "map_content": "9) Threat model mapping to prompt-injection\n- Control-plane isolation: Only signed envelopes can change behavior, tools, or policies. Untrusted content is data-only.\n- Scope minimization: Even valid signed prompts are confined to explicit capabilities.\n- Replay resistance: Nonces + expiry + session scoping.\n- Key hygiene: Owner uses multisig or account abstraction; session keys are short-lived and revocable.\n- Optional TEEs/attestation: Run verification and policy enforcement in a TEE; publish attestation so external tools know the agent enforces capabilities.",
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